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ABSTRACT
This article explores the forced closure of FC Barcelona in June 
1925. When the club resumed activity six months later, its eco-
nomic situation was even stronger than it had been before the 
suspension. The aim of this paper is to reveal the factors under-
lying this course of events. The strategic factors that allowed the 
club to remedy the situation included the close links between the 
fans and the institution, which went beyond purely sporting 
aspects; the club’s capacity to adapt its governance model to the 
new circumstances; and its ability to influence the bodies govern-
ing the sport.
In June 1925, FC Barcelona was shut down for political reasons during the military 
directory of General Miguel Primo de Rivera.1 It remained closed for six months. 
The ban on sporting and social activities placed the club at real risk of permanent 
closure because of financial insolvency. However, when FC Barcelona (henceforth, 
FCB or Barça) resumed activity, its economic and financial situation was even 
stronger than it had been when it received the sanction. Numerous social history 
studies have indicated the role of football as a catalyst for socio-political tensions, 
including the use of the stadium as a platform for political demands.2 However, the 
management and organizational side of the professional football needs more explo-
ration, as stressed by authors such as Matthew McDowell, Alex Gillet and Kevin 
Tennent.3
The aim of this research is to study the FCB board of director’s strategy for 
coping with the closure, and highlight the key factors in the FCB’s economic and 
social survival. The main factors analysed are members’ loyalty and the club’s capacity 
to adapt its governance structure to the new situation. The ability to influence 
football’s governing bodies, essentially the Catalan Football Federation, is also briefly 
examined. The hypothesis explored is that FC Barcelona’s economic and financial 
capacity was unimpaired so it could maintain its sporting structure, due to the close 
emotional attachment its members and fans felt towards the club. This attachment 
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transcended purely sporting aspects and was forged because the club had linked its 
image to Catalan nationalism, building an emotional brand.4 Barça and the Catalan 
nationalist movement both emerged during the same era and grew alongside each 
other.5 The capacity to associate an organization’s image with the dissemination of 
certain values or actions of a civic, moral, employment-related or political nature 
has been identified as a potential source of competitive advantage in time.6 This 
link, whereby non-political actors introduce a political dimension into their activity,7 
explains why Barça’s members continued to pay their fees even when the club could 
not offer them its core product, that is, regular football matches.
Ensuring the club’s economic viability was a necessary condition for survival. 
However, this alone was not sufficient in a highly adverse institutional setting. FCB 
was forced to adapt its governance structure to the requirements of the Spanish 
nationalist regime if it wanted to continue operating. In doing so, the democratic 
base of the organization was damaged, since the principle by which the president 
and board of directors was elected, under the system of one member one vote, was 
broken. However, this was the price to pay for staying alive. This situation appears 
to have generated the antibodies required to survive under hostile authoritarian 
regimes and reinforced the ability of the club’s governance structure to adapt to 
change and threat. The competitive advantage seems to have lasted over time. For 
example, Sean Hamil and Geoff Walters highlighted FCB’s ability to reframe its 
governance structure by combining its commercial strategy with the democratic base 
of the organization as a distinctive feature of its competitive advantage at the dawn 
of the twenty-first century.8
The research was based on primary FCB sources, such as the minutes of board 
meetings and members’ assemblies and the general journal and general ledger that 
were consulted at FC Barcelona’s Documentation and Study Centre (CDE-FCB).9 
However, the association fund of the archive of the Government’s Subdelegation in 
Catalonia (ASGC) was also used, especially in relation to the record of the club’s 
sanction. The main media publications of the time were consulted, including Stadium, 
La Vanguardia, La Veu de Catalunya, L’Esport Català, El Mundo Deportivo, and La 
Jornada Deportiva. The next section describes the club’s financial situation at the 
time of the suspension. The paper then goes on to analyse the way in which the 
club overcame the crisis, at both economic and institutional level. The final section 
offers some conclusions.
The Situation
The Sanction in Context and Time
In the middle of 1925, Futbol Club Barcelona was at the height of its sporting 
success and social relevance. In the season when it celebrated its 25th anniversary, 
FC Barcelona, whose squad included players such as Josep Samitier, Paulino Alcántara 
and Ferenc Plattkó,10 won the Catalan championship for the 14th time, with five 
titles in the past six seasons, and the Spanish championship for the sixth time, with 
three titles in the past six seasons.11 From a social point of view, Barça closed 1924 
with over 12,000 members and had strengthened its association with the cultural 
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and political grievances of the Catalan national minority.12 Barça’s ground provided 
the setting for the biggest anti-monarchist protest since the nationalist dictatorship 
of Primo de Rivera had been established, and FCB came close to disappearing as 
a result.
Joaquín Milans del Bosch, former Captain General of Catalonia (1918–20) and 
former head of the Military House of the Royal Household (1920–24), was appointed 
civil governor of Barcelona in June 1924. In line with the dictatorship’s instructions, 
one of the focal points of his policy was intense repression of Catalan nationalism.13 
One of its first measures was to sign a provision under which all entities, including 
hiking centres, choral societies, newspapers and magazines that commemorated 11 
September, considered by Catalan nationalists to be their national day, were subject 
to the jurisdiction of the law of crimes against the unity of the fatherland. FCB 
was one of the entities affected, although intermediation by influential Barça fans 
such as the marquises of Alella and Foronda meant that the disciplinary proceedings 
were resolved with a fine of 10,000 pesetas14, the equivalent of just over 22,500 
euros in 2017.15
The 1924/25 season ended with two Catalan teams being declared champions of 
the top two tiers of Spanish football. The winner of the second division was CE 
Jupiter, a team that was based in the industrial Barcelona neighbourhood of Sant 
Martí de Provençals and had close links to anarcho-syndicalism and political Catalan 
nationalism. In fact, its emblem, which featured the four Catalan bars crowned by 
a five-pointed star, had been banned by Milans del Bosch.16 FCB decided to organize 
a match between the two champions to pay tribute to the Orfeó Català, one of the 
entities most persecuted by the civil government due to its strong Catalan nation-
alism. Although the Barça fans regarded Jupiter as a somewhat feeble rival, the fact 
that the tribute to the choral society had been banned helped attract a 15,000-strong 
crowd to the match.17 Aware of the match, the commander of a Royal Navy ship 
that was passing Barcelona asked his fellow countryman Arthur Witty, who had 
been president of FCB between 1903 and 1905, if he could send him some tickets 
for his crew. To express his gratitude for the 300 tickets he received, the commander 
provided the ship’s music band to liven up the interval.18 On the afternoon of 14 
June 1925, the Brits played the first chords of the Royal March, the Spanish national 
anthem, amid a crescendo of whistles that gave way to a resounding boo. Even 
those who didn’t participate in the whistles, including the club’s directors, remained 
seated, and ‘very few people listened to it with the respect and devotion it deserved’.19 
When a few bewildered Brits burst into a rendition of God Save the King, the 
crowd gave them a warm standing ovation.20
The first letters from ‘true Spaniards’ who demanded ‘heroic solutions to the 
plague that is infecting this corner of the homeland’21 did not take long to reach 
the civil government. The recommendations included forcing all civil society orga-
nizations to wave the Spanish flag at least once a week, as well as the dissolution 
of FCB and a severe punishment for its directors if they did not carry out an act 
of respect and honour for the flag within two weeks.22 After the Barcelona Security 
Corps started proceedings against the club, the chief of police asked the civil gov-
ernor on 21 June to ‘close or definitively dissolve said entity due to its marked 
political leanings, and to deport chairman Juan Gamper Haessig, a foreign national, 
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from Spain.’23 Two days later, Milans del Bosch closed FC Barcelona for a period 
of six months, during which it was banned from ‘holding any matches at its stadium 
or visiting other stadia as a football club, and using the club’s emblems and dis-
tinctive signs’.24 The measure was designed to sink the club financially.
The Stadium in Les Corts and Its Impact on the Club’s Finances
The first FCB general journal consulted starts on 1 June 1925. Although the format 
of the book is not in keeping with current standards, the fact that the opening 
balance sheet was dated so close to the suspension means that it offers a very 
accurate overview of the club’s financial situation at the time of the sanction.25 The 
figures, presented in Table 1, reflect assets valued at 1,961,972.71 pesetas (4,463,385.38 
euros in 2017), with 94 per cent corresponding to the items ‘land owned’ and the 
‘Les Corts ground facilities’. With respect to liabilities, the debt incurred to finance 
the stadium, made up of the mortgage on the land and some mortgage bonds, 
accounted for two thirds.26 In accounting terms, therefore, FCB was essentially a 
football stadium. The entity’s poor liquidity is also worth noting, since it had little 
more than 5,000 pesetas in cash and just over 14,000 pesetas in three immediately 
accessible credit accounts; a pitiful 1 per cent of its assets.
As demonstrated by English football clubs, which in terms of professionalism and 
commercial development were two or three decades ahead of their continental peers, 
owning a stadium with a substantial capacity was key to creating a competitive 
Table 1. FCB: opening balance sheet, 1 June 1925.
Ptas Ptas %
Cash 5,629.39 0.3
Jover i Cia [credit institution] 13,357.30 0.7
Banc de Catalunya 134.1 0.0
Fills de J. Mas Sardà [credit institution] 739.63 0.0
Deposits 21,873.30 1.1
– Capital gains to Bank of Spain 15,573.30
– Arbitration agreements to the company 6,000.00
– Salary retention Nagoreda 300.00
Loans 31,650.00 1.6
Movable assets 16,798.95 0.9
FC Gracia (outstanding receivable  
Camp Vell stand)
4,650.00 0.2
Camp Vell ground (own valuation) 9,095.24 0.5
Les Corts ground facilities (net of 
depreciation)
844,650.75 43.0
Land owned (purchase price) 991,984.05 50.1
Payments to be recovered 17,910.00 0.9
Banners and pennants 3,500.00 0.2
Total assets 1,961,972.71
Mortgage on land 703,500.00 35.9
Mortgage bonds 497,000.00 25.3
Jover i Cia 101,323.15 5.2
Capital 567,956.98 28.9
Depreciations 53,044.94 2.7
– Les Corts ground 42,150.75
– Camp Vell ground 9,095.24
– Movable assets 1,798.95
P&L 39,146.64 2.0
Total liabilities 1,961,972.71
Source: General journal of FC Barcelona, 1/6/1925–31/5/1926, pp. 1–2.
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advantage, since it represented a football club’s main source of income.27 However, 
achieving the economies of speed necessary to dilute the high fixed costs of con-
structing a stadium until they were profitable required a high number of matches 
per season, but this was limited by the players’ physical capacity and the fans’ degree 
of saturation. Although this was a necessary condition, it was not enough in itself. 
If the stadium did not fill up on a regular basis, it would be impossible to sustain 
a top-quality performance, and this would lead to a competitive disadvantage.
FCB had been preparing to build a new ground since the beginning of the decade. 
At the assembly held on 27 June 1920, when Gaspar Rosés was declared president 
for the second time,28 the members voted to increase the monthly fee from two to 
three pesetas (equivalent to from 4.13 to 6.20 euros in 2017).29 This was an excep-
tional measure, given that the fee had not changed since the club’s creation in 1899,30 
and was designed to strengthen the entity’s financial situation in view of the upcom-
ing work to construct the stadium. The project, however, was designed, planned 
and executed during Hans Gamper’s fourth term, which began on 17 July 1921.31 
The Swiss national, convinced of the need to provide the club with a playing field 
in keeping with its membership base, turned the project into the cornerstone of his 
action plan. The ground on ‘Carrer Indústria’, which seated just 6,000 fans,32 was 
significantly limiting Barça’s competitive capacity at a time when football was already 
a source of mass entertainment and pure amateurism was nothing more than an 
illusion, since the best players received handouts under the table that provided them 
with a relatively comfortable standard of living.33
Just before the end of the year, Gamper convened an extraordinary assembly to 
ratify the choice of land, located in the Les Corts district, the construction project 
and the financing of the operation.34 The agenda was published in the weekly 
newspaper La Jornada Deportiva. The financing of the operation, which represented 
the main focus of the assembly, was specified in the third and fifth points. While 
the third stipulated that the board was authorized to issue mortgage bonds up to 
1 million pesetas (2,316,131.64 euros in 2017) at an annual interest of 5 per cent, 
the fifth authorized the issue of 5,000 cooperation bonds of 100 pesetas each, exclu-
sively for members, each to be returned in annual interest-free instalments of 10 
pesetas. To encourage the members to participate, it was proposed that special prizes 
be created for mortgage bond holders (sixth point) and that the monthly member-
ship fee be increased by one peseta for those who did not purchase any cooperation 
bonds (seventh point).35 Although the president’s proposal was actively opposed by 
a small number of members, which created some tension,36 the nearly 2,000 mem-
bers at the meeting approved the proposal unanimously.37 According to Rossend 
Calvet, one of the club’s administrative employees, the incentive for members to 
acquire mortgage bonds was a seat for life in the stadium if they purchased a min-
imum of 5,000 pesetas (11,580.66 euros in 2017), a condition fulfilled by 108 
members, who forked out a total of 568,600 pesetas.38 The 243 members who par-
ticipated raised a total of 627,700 pesetas.39 When these figures are considered in 
relation to the opening balance sheet shown in Table 1, it makes sense to assume 
that the mortgage bonds correspond to the heading ‘mortgage on land’, while the 
cooperation bonds are consistent with the heading ‘mortgage bonds’.
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Table 2. FCB: matches played per season (starting on 20 May).
Home
Official Friendly (origin of team)
Catalonia Spain Europe Total Total Away Total
20–21 5 6 11 14 31 36 13 49
21–22 7 3 4 13 20 27 19 46
Average 6.0 4.5 7.5 13.5 25.5 31.5 16.0 47.5
22–23 5 2 4 28 34 39 21 60
23–24 12 4 8 22 34 46 31 77
Average 8.5 3.0 6.0 25.0 34.0 42.5 26.0 68.5
Source: Prepared by the author based on Carbó, Historial.
The fact that the cash inflow was almost immediate supports the evidence that 
the bulk of the debt was held by the members. Gamper reported that they had the 
necessary financial resources at the end of January.40 The land purchase deed was 
signed on 18 February and construction began the following morning.41 What would 
become known as Camp de Les Corts was inaugurated three months later, on 20 
May, with a match against Scottish team St. Mirren. Although the match was played 
on dirt and the ground was still a long way off being fitted out in accordance with 
the plans, it was a groundbreaking stadium in Europe due to the size of the pitch 
(101 metres long by 66 metres wide), the convenience of the stands and the comfort 
of the changing rooms. When it was inaugurated, it had 25,000 seats, although the 
capacity had reached 30,000 by the time of the suspension, following the addition 
of a stand without interior pillars that seated 5,000 fans.42
To make the major investment profitable, FCB started organizing more friendly 
matches, especially against foreign rivals, since these allowed the club to charge 
much higher ticket prices than those of Catalan championship matches. As shown 
in Table 2, the number of friendly matches played in Les Corts in the two seasons 
following its inauguration increased significantly compared to the average of the 
two preceding seasons (8.5 more matches). Foreign rivals played a leading role, with 
25 games per season, compared to three against Catalan rivals and six against rivals 
from the rest of Spain. The sudden ban on matches meant denying the club the 
economies of speed that had allowed it to enjoy a return on the huge investment 
it had made a couple of years earlier.
The evolution of the number of members shown in Figure 1 illustrates the stra-
tegic importance of the stadium. The club opened 1922 with just over 4,000 mem-
bers, a figure that had trebled by the end of 1924. It was a feedback process. The 
growth of its membership base required that a larger stadium be built, which, in 
turn, made it easier for Barça to continue growing. However, the expansion predated 
the construction of the new ground. FCB took 13 years to exceed 1,000 members 
(1913), while it took four years to achieve 2,000 (1917), three to reach 3,000 (1920) 
and just one year to reach 4,000 (1921). The rise in members occurred in parallel 
with the increasingly explicit commitment to the values  of political Catalan nation-
alism advocated by the Commonwealth of Catalonia, an institution made up of the 
regional governments of Catalonia’s four provinces.43 Of note in this regard were 
the club’s adoption of Catalan as the preferred language of use in 1916 and its active 
participation in the campaign that called for the right to self-government, promoted 
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by the Commonwealth and virtually all Catalan councils in 1918–19.44 Significantly, 
in the first meeting of the board headed by Ricard Graells, held in June 1919, it 
was declared that the club would continue to reaffirm its Catalan status, as estab-
lished by the preceding boards.45 The smear campaign undertaken by the Madrid 
press and various Spanish organizations in both Madrid and Barcelona also helped 
reaffirm the link between Barça and Catalan nationalism.46
To understand the effect of the closure on the club’s financial situation, it is 
important to understand the revenue and cost structure. Unfortunately, it was not 
possible to obtain the list of payables and receivables for the season prior to the 
closure (1924/25), so the closest data available relate to the 1923/24 season. As shown 
in Table 3, the main expenditure categories that season were those related to the 
first and second football teams, which accounted for just over a third of the total. 
Just over 55 per cent of these expenses related to payments to other teams that 
visited for friendly matches, and almost 15 per cent was used to pay for trips to 
rival grounds. These two items accounted for a quarter of the club’s expenses. Tax 
payments, with 16 per cent of the total, was the second largest category, followed 
by maintenance of the facilities, with 13.8 per cent. Financial expenses amounted to 
12.2 per cent, while publicity and advertising costs were close to 10 per cent. Lastly, 
the club’s administration accounted for 7.5 per cent of total spending, most of which 
corresponded to staff salaries. The club’s closure presumably led to a reduction in 
football-related expenses and other items directly related to matches, such as adver-
tising and taxes.
To meet these expenses, FC Barcelona’s two main sources of revenue were 
membership fees and ticket sales, which together accounted for more than 90 per 
cent of income. The suspension imposed by the civil government completely cut 
off ticket sales and other income associated with use of the ground, so Barça’s 
survival depended on retaining its members. The sanction challenged the loyalty 
Figure 1. FCB: number of members by season (on 31 December). Source: FC Barcelona’s 
Documentation and Study Centre.
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of FC Barcelona’s members and tested the robustness of its foundations for 
expansion.
The Resolution
The Board’s First Strategy to Address the Sanction
Two days after the act of protest, Gamper received a statement from the civil gov-
ernment to inform him that disciplinary proceedings had been commenced and 
that, until a resolution was reached, the club was banned from carrying out any 
type of activity and the presidency was stripped of its responsibilities.47 The board 
of directors met immediately and agreed to write to Milans del Bosch to offer 
assistance in whatever he might need and to inform him that the directors did not 
support any demonstration designed to disparage ‘the institutions representing the 
homeland and its symbols’.48 The act of contrition was carried out unanimously and 
without any discussion.
Table 3. FCB: income and expenditure, 1923/24 season.a
Expenditure Revenue
Items Pesetas % Items Pesetas %
Football 366,912.87 37.3 Membership fees 484,990.00 48.6
Subsidies to clubs 211,005.02 21.4 Ticket sales 428,366.70 42.9
Team travel 50,615.45 5.1 Joverb 53,530.55 5.4
Organization of matches 35,432.75 3.6 Hire of ground 22,950.00 2.3




23,940.75 2.4 Other 5,486.80 0.5
Taxes 159,434.18 16.2
Facilities 135,486.92 13.8
Les Corts ground 54,541.55 5.4
Works 53,644.82 5.3
Financial expenses 119,584.74 12.2
Mortgage on land 
(annual)
50,000.00 5.0
Interest on mortgage 
bonds
28,976.44 2.9





Gifts to visiting clubs 30,533.05 3.0
Administration 73,520.95 7.5
Staff 50,370.00 5.0
Office material 22,155.50 2.2
Other 28,054.50 2.8
Total 2017 euros 983,771.26 
2,224,351.98
Total 2017 euros 1,001,512.95 
2,264,466.76
aThe expenses, which appeared in no apparent order in the list consulted, have been grouped by headings (in 
italics), which have been organized from highest to lowest. Within each heading, only the main items are shown. 
The total of each heading includes items not reflected in the table. The same applies to Table 4.
bThe item ‘Jover y Compañía’, which corresponds to a credit facility with this institution, with payments of 603,222.00 
pesetas and receivables of 656,753.45 pesetas, has been recorded as income of 53,530.55 pesetas.
Source: FCB, Minutes of the General Assembly (ASGC, Box 181).
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Gamper went to ‘Atarazanas’ police station two days later, after some of its officers 
had sealed up the club’s social premises. He was informed that the club was banned 
from holding the annual assembly of members, which was scheduled to take place 
in eleven days, and that it was only allowed to hold a board meeting that very day 
to address the most pressing issues.49 According to an account by his friend Narcís 
Deop, the Swiss-born Gamper had not only been humiliated and mocked on the 
official premises that morning, but he had also been ordered to leave Spain.50 That 
afternoon, a visibly emotional Gamper addressed the members of the board, in the 
presence of a delegate from the civil government, to explain the seriousness of the 
situation. He explained that they had been banned from holding the mandatory 
assembly and, therefore, had to approve both the annual report and the statement 
of accounts, which was done unanimously. He then submitted his resignation.51 
Although he had been living in Spain for nearly 30 years, he was a Protestant who 
had been born a free citizen in a direct democracy, and he found the situation deeply 
disturbing.52
Just one week after the sanction, Joan Coma, as vice-president of FCB, sent a 
letter to Milans del Bosch in which he once again disassociated the club from any 
political intent and requested that the sanction be lifted due to the dire consequences 
it could entail.53 With respect to management, Coma argued that the board would 
be forced to sack office staff, but that since they had been stripped of legal repre-
sentation, they would not be in a position to do so, nor would they be able to pay 
debts or collect any outstanding revenue, which was crucial to maintaining regular 
operations.54 The vice-president’s concerns focussed primarily on the club’s inability 
to meet its mortgage repayments and interest charges, since this could lead to an 
enforcement procedure on the land.55 The civil governor responded two days later, 
Table 4. FCB: expenditure, 1925/26 season.
Items Pesetas
Δ with respect  
to 1923/24 (%)
Share of the  
total (%)
Change with 
respect to  
1923/24
Football 366,430.56 0.1 50.4 +13.1
Football commission 212,185.15 New item
Subsidies to clubs 67,845.85 67.8 9.3 12.1
Travel 36,384.55 28.1 5.0 0.1
Sports expenses 31,412.51 11.3 4.3 +0.7
Medical service 14,883.55 37.8 2.0 0.4
Material 3,081.85 87.1 0.4 2.0
Administration 100,035.25 38.1 14.0 +6.5
Office expenses 59,465.45 168.4 8.2 +5.9
Office staff 40,569.80 19.5 5.6 +0.5
Taxes 82,527.41 48.2 11.4 4.8
Facilities 70,956.95 47.6 9.8 4.0
Les Corts 
(depreciation)
40,500.00 New item 5.7
Les Corts upkeep 25,476.30 New item 3.6
Financial expenses 54,637.78 54.3 7.5 4.7
Interest 31,260.40 New item 4.3
Coupons 23,377.50 New item 3.2
Publicity 20,842.70 79.4 2.9 7.4






Source: FCB, General journal, 1/6/1925–31/7/1926, pp. 93–94.
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when he maintained that he could not lift the sports sanction, since it would under-
mine the purpose of the measure; however, with respect to the financial aspect, he 
authorized the board (‘even though it has been dissolved’) to fulfil its civil duties; 
in other words, to pay its staff, collect revenue and pay loans, as well as to exercise 
its rights before the courts.56
Five days later, following a request for permission to hold a meeting to discuss 
financial matters, the chief of police informed Pere Sayé, the club’s treasurer, that 
neither he nor the office staff were banned from entering the social premises, but 
that under no circumstances were meetings of either directors or members allowed.57 
Finally, the meeting was held in the presence of a delegate of the governor. It has 
been suggested that the meeting was made possible thanks to the efforts of Arcadio 
Balaguer, a personal friend of Primo de Rivera and Alfonso XIII;58 as will be seen, 
Balaguer ended up being made president of the club by the board of directors, but 
he was barely known in the world of football at that time and he knew little about 
the game.59 The main purpose of the meeting was to read out the correspondence 
with the civil government and to document the directors’ low morale. Citing a high 
workload and numerous personal engagements, Sayé asked to resign, but Pere Cusell 
refused to accept his resignation on the basis that they were all in the same boat 
and that it was absolutely essential for everyone to get involved ‘to save the club 
from likely disaster in the event that they jump ship in the current circumstances.’60 
When the treasurer reiterated his desire to resign, the response from the other 
directors was indicative of the despondency in the room. If his resignation was 
accepted, they too would resign. Coma, as acting president, asked them all to make 
the necessary sacrifices to save Barça. Although no resignations were accepted, it 
was decided that the club would be managed by an executive committee made up 
of Coma, Sayé and Cusell themselves, plus Andreu Soldevila and Antoni Coll.61
The board met again a month later, on 11 August, once again in the presence 
of a delegate of the governor. At that meeting, the club’s means of financial survival 
were outlined. Following a discussion regarding the way the entity was being man-
aged,62 the treasurer reported that a considerable sum was being raised by the 
members, in the form of both refundable subscriptions and non-refundable donations, 
while the 50,000-peseta credit facility with Jover had been renewed.63 Thus, FCB 
had secured sufficient liquidity to pay office staff, creditors and also, reading between 
the lines, the players.64 However, neither Gamper’s resignation nor the constant 
claims of the entity’s purely sporting nature helped lift the sanction. The board of 
directors would not meet again officially until 2 November.
The Shift in Governance
The upper echelons of the club, an amalgamation of industrialists and traders, knew 
the solution to this situation that had grown out of control: they had to take the 
lead, even if this meant that they did not represent the will of the members. Those 
who did not meet the governor’s approval took a step back or were pushed aside, 
starting with Hans Gamper, whose triple status as a foreigner, Protestant and Catalan 
nationalist made him a target for the dictatorship. When the sanction was lifted, 
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the aforementioned Arcadio Balaguer was in charge at FCB. Naturally, the process 
to promote the future baron occurred through undemocratic means,65 thereby betray-
ing the principles of the club. At the board meeting on 9 December, held once 
again in the mandatory presence of a delegate of the governor, Andreu Soldevila 
proposed that they study the candidates who would manage the entity most effec-
tively, although it is clear from his long speech that he already had names in mind.66 
In case there was any doubt, he stressed that they had to be newcomers.67
Three days later, under the mandatory supervision of a government delegate, the 
board met with the advisory council to agree on the names of the future board of 
directors. Soldevila thanked the ‘authorities’ for the treatment meted out during the 
sanction,68 before announcing that the people whose ‘moral standards could help 
overcome the club’s bad reputation’69 had been identified, and noting that the efforts 
of Narciso Masferrer and José Vidal-Ribas Güell had proved pivotal to the success 
of the process.70 Soldevila suggested Balaguer as future president, who would be 
accompanied by Santiago Soler, Amado Casajuana, Francesc Quintana, Magín Matheu, 
Juan B. Roca and Vidal-Ribas himself.71 He then explained that if the proposal were 
accepted, Milans del Bosch would finally see that ‘the club was engaged in sport 
and sport alone’.72
Soldevila, who was aware of the danger of presenting these names to a general 
assembly of members, in accordance with statutory requirements, suggested that 
they invoke articles 23 and 24 of the articles of association, which allowed the board 
of directors to fill its own vacancies. However, the assembly of members still held 
exclusive powers to elect the president, so Balaguer should be listed as vice-president 
with the responsibilities of acting president.73 Lluis Torres Ullastres, a member of 
the advisory council, exemplified the opposition to the move. He argued that it was 
essential to call an assembly and that, in any case, the board, once there, could 
endorse the candidacy it deemed most appropriate.74 The response from Vidal-Ribas, 
one of the individuals approved by the dictatorship, was crystal clear: he pointed 
out that it was vital to avoid surprises and, therefore, essential that the directors be 
appointed by the board itself.75 This fear of giving the members a voice was encap-
sulated in the words of Pedro Cabot, a member of the advisory council: ‘the cir-
cumstances advise against putting the decision to the assembly, where the men 
making the sacrifice of helping us today could be unfairly ridiculed, at a time when 
their actions must not be remotely dissenting’.76 Masferrer settled the matter: ‘If the 
decision goes to the assembly, the club’s doors will close again, this time forever.’77 
Those in charge of the negotiations with the civil government were afraid to give 
the members a voice because they knew what their reaction would be.
Five days later, Arcadio Balaguer was appointed vice-president with the respon-
sibilities of acting president. After assigning the remaining board vacancies and 
setting up the committees responsible for the day-to-day running of the club (foot-
ball, the ground, publicity, finances, hockey and athletics),78 FC Barcelona resumed 
normal activities two days later.79 The evidence suggests that Milans del Bosch 
agreed not to dissolve FC Barcelona in return for a board of directors of his choos-
ing.80 Since the board dared not call an assembly of members because it was con-
sidered too risky, the new directors were appointed by the board itself based on 
the recommendations of the advisory committee. Gamper, the founder of Barça, was 
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singled out as the main culprit for the club’s deviation. After travelling to Switzerland 
for a few weeks, Gamper was back in Barcelona in early August,81 although he was 
forced to promise that he would never again form part of the club’s management 
bodies.82
As shown in Figure 1, few members left during the club’s closure. After six 
months of inactivity, FC Barcelona closed 1925 with 10,156 members, 17 per cent 
less than the previous year. This figure seems to suggest that FCB had already 
consolidated the bulk of its membership base, since more than 10,000 people con-
tinued to pay their fees even after six months without any matches. Although this 
figure was lower than the number of members at the end of 1923, it was 40 per 
cent higher than in 1922. The club had preferred not to consult these loyal members 
concerning the entity’s governance, thereby betraying the democratic principles that 
had characterized the club since its creation.
In mid-June 1926, the postponed assembly of members was held, which was 
started without Balaguer in attendance, even though the main point was ratification 
of his appointment as president.83 The assembly was stormy with a lot of member 
opposition to the task of the new board, as well as some bemoaning of Gamper’s 
absence.84 The moment of greatest tension occurred when the committee proposed 
that Balaguer’s board should be ratified by acclamation, that is, without being put 
to the vote. Finally, after attending members’ attempt to present an alternative can-
didate, Balaguer was endorsed by ‘acclamation’ under the threat that the club could 
be shut down again.85 Balaguer presided over FCB until the end of March 1929, 
when he resigned.86 His replacement was the industrialist and banker Tomás Rosés, 
son of an important family of textile industrialists and also a figure to the liking 
of the dictatorship. An examination of the minute book of the FCB’s board of 
directors does not show that he was elected through an assembly of members.87 
The evolution in the number of members that can be seen in Table 1 seems to 
indicate that FCB members understood that the context of a dictatorship impeded 
any active opposition and they had to accept that the club was governed by men 
approved by the dictatorship.
Primo de Rivera resigned in January 1930 and King Alfonso XIII replaced him 
with General Dámaso Berenguer with the aim of returning to a constitutional sit-
uation. Political tolerance increased significantly during this regime focussed on 
transition, which enabled a certain degree of normality to be recovered in the 
management of social entities such as FC Barcelona.88 A few months after the res-
ignation of Primo, Gaspar Rosés – who was not related to Tomás Rosés – was 
chosen as the president of the club, this time after the required vote in the general 
assembly of members. The election of Gaspar Rosés meant a return to the situation 
prior to the closure of the club, as he had already been president on two occasions 
(1916–17) and (1920–21). Significantly, the first minutes of the board of directors 
written in Catalan in the club’s books were of the first meeting chaired by Rosés 
after his election on 25 June 1916. After prohibition of the use of Catalan by the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, the first minutes in which the use of Catalan was 
recovered were those of the first board meeting of the third mandate of Gaspar 
Rosés. The uselessness of the dictatorship’s efforts to disassociate Barça from Catalan 
nationalism can be seen in the choice of the industrialist and politician Josep Sunyol, 
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member of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya party – a Catalan-nationalist 
left-wing party that held the Catalan Government and the Barcelona Council during 
the Republic – as a President of the club in July 1935.89 Sunyol was executed by 
Franco troops on the roadside close to Madrid a few weeks after the outbreak of 
the Civil War, when he was the president of FC Barcelona, and a member of the 
Spanish parliament. The rebel faction was very clear about what FC Barcelona 
continued to represent.
The Keys to Economic Survival
As shown in Table 4, during the season of the suspension, the club’s expenses were 
reduced by 29 per cent with respect to the 1923/24 season. Items directly related 
to the number of matches played, such as advertising, taxes and the stadium, were 
among those that decreased the most, although the financial expenses fell even more 
significantly. However, with respect to the latter, the headings recorded had different 
names, and it was therefore difficult to establish a consistent comparison.90 
Nevertheless, since most of the debt was held by the members, it can be inferred 
that some may have waived the interest or principal during the year of the sanction. 
Unfortunately, since we were unable to consult an annual report or a white book 
for that year, in which the accounting criteria would be explained, this interpretation 
cannot be validated by direct sources.91
The data available show that the payments directly associated with the activity 
of the first and second teams during the year of the sanction not only continued 
to be the club’s main source of expenditure, which would be expected of a football 
club, but also increased in proportion to reach just over half of the total. Among 
these expenses, the appearance of a new item, ‘football commission’, which accounted 
for 30 per cent of the expenses, is noteworthy. The club had a committee called 
‘football’, whose task was to prepare the first and second team squads. It is therefore 
plausible that this item included payments for the players, since professionalism had 
been authorized in the summer of 1924 and work was under way to establish the 
regulations. In fact, players’ salaries first surfaced in the accounts of the following 
season and resulted in payments of 220,035.00 pesetas (a quarter of total expendi-
ture),92 a value very similar to that associated with the item ‘football commission’. 
If this hypothesis is true, it would imply that the significant reduction in spending 
on hiring outside clubs, travel, medical service and materials would have been fully 
offset by payments to the Catalan and Spanish champion players. This would suggest 
that the priority during the suspension was to maintain the competitive level of the 
first team.
With respect to the club’s economic performance, however, the ability to sustain 
the level of income played a more decisive role than the reduction in expenses. 
Despite the fact that the club had been inactive for half the financial year, its 
expenses were reduced by just 9 per cent with respect to the 1923/24 season.93 
Although revenue from ticket sales decreased by 20 per cent, revenue from member 
fees fell by just 7 per cent. Of the more than 900,000 pesetas that entered the 
club’s coffers, only 1 per cent corresponded to donations, although, as shown in 
Table 5, the items grouped in ‘other’ gained particular importance, given that they 
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contributed almost 12 per cent of income. Within this group, more than 90 per 
cent of the entries corresponded to the heading ‘subscription’, but it was impossible 
to determine what this referred to. The financial data indicate that the loyalty of 
the members played a key role in sustaining the club’s earnings. This interpretation 
is consistent with the treasurer’s assessment at the board meeting held on 9 
December 1925, when he informed the other directors that the members’ contri-
butions had been sufficient to cover all expenses during the months in which the 
club was closed.94
The attitude of FCB’s Catalan rivals also helps to explain the club’s economic 
performance.95 Barça was able to take part in the championship organized by the 
FCF since its opponents agreed to postpone the original October start date until 
January 1926, in a decision adopted at the general assembly of the FCF held in 
August. This was not merely a gesture of support or solidarity for FCB; the decision 
was also based on financial reasons, since Barça’s visits attracted the biggest crowds 
of the season. This may well explain why the measure was supported even by clubs 
that felt a deep animosity towards Barcelona, but whose grounds were oversized in 
relation to their fan base. For FCB, this support from the other clubs was vital. Not 
only was it able to earn a considerable amount in ticket sales − 40 per cent of the 
season’s ticket sales96 – but its victory in the championship allowed it to enter the 
Spanish championship,97 which it won for the second time in a row. The impact of 
the inactivity on the club’s revenue meant that it faced the season of the suspension 
with the same squad that had won the double the previous season. This, combined 
with the almost 30 per cent reduction in total expenditure with respect to the 
previous two seasons, helps explain why the club was able to close the financial 
year of the forced suspension in the black.98
The Legacy of the Forced Closure of 1925
The total suspension of activity for six months decreed by the civil governor in 
June 1925 was a measure that jeopardized the very existence of FC Barcelona, since 
its income depended on the regular matches played by its football team. The hypoth-
esis presented is that both the sanction and the club’s financial performance were 
the result of the strong emotional bonds between the members and the entity, which 
were underpinned by cultural and political Catalan nationalism. The event held in 
1925 is itself evidence of these bonds, since the match was organized as a tribute 
to a choral society that had been persecuted for its strong Catalan nationalism, and 
Table 5. FCB: income, 1925/26 season.
Items Pesetas
Δ with respect to 
1923/24 (%)




Membership fees 449,357.70 7.35 48.9 +0.3
Ticket sales 342,715.69 19.99 37.3 5.6
Hire of ground 10,274.35 55.23 1.1 1.2
Donations 10,214.85 New item 1.1






Source: FCB, General journal, 1/6/1925–31/7/1926, p. 94.
680 T. FERNÁNDEZ-DE-SEVILLA
the chosen rival was a club that was also in the crosshairs of the military directory. 
In the context of the Spanish nationalist dictatorship, whose acts were harsh and 
vindictive against opponents, and the penalties were arbitrary, an event of this type 
was, in itself, a declaration of intent. The fact that 15,000 people attended the match 
and the reaction of most of the spectators to the Spanish anthem also reveal the 
emotional connection felt by Barça fans. The threat that the club would not reopen 
if an assembly of members were convened to elect the new president, for fear that 
the candidacy approved by the dictatorship would be ‘ridiculed’ by the members, 
provides further evidence of this. This emotional connection also helps explain the 
financial support received by the club during the suspension. Members continued 
to pay their fees and the payments resulting from the debt incurred, which was 
held mostly by the members, were lower than expected.
Although FCB was able to maintain its sporting structure, the same cannot be 
said for its governance model, which had to be adapted. When Barça resumed 
activity, the club was led by a board of directors that had been approved by the 
dictatorship rather than elected in the annual assembly of members, as was man-
datory. When the sanction was imposed, barely a week had passed since the event 
that had given rise to it. Faced with this situation of institutional coercion, there 
was no other option but to win, if not the favour, then at least the tolerance of the 
regime, and this was reflected in the composition of the governing bodies, even 
though it meant undermining the club’s democratic character. FCB not only managed 
to achieve a specific solution to the politico-institutional situation it was facing, but 
it also knew how to influence the FCF to ensure that it could contest the champi-
onship of Catalonia; this was a strategic factor because of the revenue generated by 
ticket sales and because it allowed the club to play in the Spanish championship in 
the event of a victory. To achieve this, FCF had to agree to vote on a delay to the 
start of the first competition, and the clubs with the right to vote had to accept 
this. The ability to influence football’s governing bodies was a strategic factor that 
helped Barça to overcome the sanction.
The long-term effects of the sanction were the opposite of what was sought. 
The closure of the club in 1925 and the execution of Sunyol in 1936 made the 
image of Barça inseparable from that of a representative of Catalan nationalism, 
even though this link could not be made explicit, as was the case during much of 
the Franco regime. The FCB grew from less than 5000 members in 1940, just after 
the Republic was defeated, to over 20,000 in 1944. At that time, Barça was one of 
the only possible ways to claim Catalan identity. During Francoism, members of 
the board of directors had to be approved by the regime and it only accepted those 
that it considered to be loyal. However, it was still the club that had been shut 
down by Primo de Rivera and whose president had been executed by the fascists 
at the start of the rebellion against the Republic. Therefore, in the long-term, the 
closure resulted in a formidable operation of branding that made Barça an emo-
tional brand for many Catalans. This capacity to construct an emotional mindset 
that transcended purely sporting aspects explains the sanction and the way in which 
the club overcame it. By its very nature, the 1925 episode almost irreversibly rein-
forced the link between Barça and Catalan nationalism, which has constituted a 
core element of the club’s long-term competitive advantage.
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 89. Although he did not present himself for the position until 1935, during the years of 
the Republic, FCB members constantly asked him to submit a candidacy. See FCB, 
Minutes of the General Assembly, 1932–35.
 90. Expenditure items are listed in the general journal entry in no apparent order.
 91. Much of FCB’s accounting information was lost on the night of 16 March 1938, when 
the club’s social premises were destroyed by a bomb dropped by Mussolini’s fascist air 
force, which carried out a series of airstrikes over Barcelona between 16 and 18 March 
that killed more than 1,000 civilians, completely destroyed 48 buildings and caused 
considerable damage to a further 50.
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 92. FCB, General journal, 1/8/1926–11/10/1929, 133–134.
 93. The financial year started on 1 June.
 94. FCB, Minutes of the Board, 09/12/1925.
 95. The Catalan championship was the most important competition in economic terms at 
the time, since it was played in a league format made up of eight teams.
 96. FCB, General journal, 1/8/1926–11/10/1929, 97.
 97. The winner of the Catalan championship classified for the Spanish championship, which 
was a two-legged knockout competition between the winners of the different regional 
championships (usually eight), with the final played as a single match at a venue des-
ignated at the beginning of the season.
 98. The difference between the income and expenses shows a positive balance close to 
200,000 pesetas, although, surprisingly, the year-end closing balance does not include 
any losses or gains. See FCB, General journal, 1/6/1925–31/7/1926, 94.
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